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How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party sys-
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exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order
negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties
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The rules of the electoral game matter a great deal. Electoral institutions have been
shown to affect a constellation of economic and political outcomes such as, to name a
few: redistribution, public spending and public good provision (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico
2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson et al. 2003, 2007), turnout (e.g. Blais and Do-
brzynska 1998; Herrera et al. 2016), and campaign spending (Iaryczower and Mattozzi
2013). Importantly, since Duverger (1954) we know that electoral rule disproportionality
(understood broadly as the size of the electoral advantage assigned to the winner of the
election) affects the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and policy platforms of
the competing parties). Indeed, it is a stylized fact that the number of competing parties
is higher in proportional representation (henceforth PR) systems compared to more dis-
proportional ones, and that proportional systems provide parties with stronger centrifugal
incentives than disproportional ones such as the plurality rule or first-past-the-post (e.g.
Cox 1990; Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Matakos et al. 2016).1
Yet, despite electoral institutions altering parties’ incentives to enter the electoral race
but also to propose moderate or extreme platforms, our understanding –both theoretically
and empirically– about the exact mechanisms via which electoral rules operate is rather
incomplete. That is, are the effects of electoral rules on party entry and platform choice
independent, or are they intertwined, thus making it more difficult to establish clear
causal links? For instance, could it be that electoral rule disproportionality has direct
effects only on the number of parties that decide to enter, and that platform decisions
are only indirectly affected by the number of competing parties? Is it likely that the
opposite holds (i.e. that electoral rules affect only platform selection, and this indirectly
determines entry decisions)? Or, even, could it be that electoral rules affect both entry
and platform selection incentives in a more convoluted manner?
The current literature has not revealed the exact mechanism via which electoral rules
jointly affect entry and platform decisions. Typically, existing approaches instead ana-
lyze the effects of the electoral rule on electoral competition by focusing either on entry
decisions, or on platform selection independently.2 The literature that focuses on en-
try decisions often builds on the citizen-candidate approach (a là Osborne and Slivinski
1996; Besley and Coate 1997). Yet candidates’ platforms are exogenously fixed –once they
1For a more extensive review on the literature regarding the effects of electoral rules on various
outcomes one is referred to Lijphart (1994), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Persson and Tabellini (2002,
2005), and Grofman (2008).
2To be fair, there are few papers that consider both endogenous entry and platform decisions by all
parties (e.g. Feddersen et al. (1990), Osborne (1993), Xefteris (2016)), but different to our work those
a) focus entirely on variations of simple plurality rule and/or runoff systems, and b) even in the context
of the plurality rule do not consider that candidates have substantial policy concerns.
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enter the election, they do so in a predetermined position– and, hence, cannot answer
the posited questions.3 Similarly, the literature which assumes an exogenous number of
parties and endogenous platform selection cannot provide the necessary answers since it
effectively shuts down the entry channel.4 In other words, there is no formal analysis
examining the simultaneous effects of electoral rule disproportionality on party entry and
platform choice and, at the same time: a) focuses on parties’ strategic decisions,5 b)
considers endogenous entry, and c) allows for the choice of platform to be endogenously
determined. Indeed, the last two points are essential if one is to account for a poten-
tially intertwined relationship between platform and entry decisions. In this paper we
undertake the task of formulating such an argument and fill the described gap in the
literature.
We consider a formal model in which parties compete under a continuum of alternative
electoral rules that differ only in terms of disproportionality, and where both entry and
platform decisions are endogenous. The parties are mainly policy motivated, in the sense
that they want the implemented policy to be as close as possible to their ideal policies,
but also care about their office rents reflected in their parliamentary power. In specific, a
party in our framework is willing to participate in the election if by doing so it can influ-
ence the implemented policy to its benefit, or if it can secure substantial parliamentary
power. If neither of these conditions are met, then it prefers to save the cost of entering
the election. Under these assumptions, we show that both the number of parties that
decide to enter and platform polarization (throughout the paper defined as the distance
between the two most distant platforms) are decreasing in electoral rule disproportional-
ity. That is, our theoretical results are in line with existing stylized facts confirming the
original Duvergerian predictions and linking PR systems with higher polarization than
disproportional ones.
But more importantly, we identify a three-step mechanism that may lie behind these
stylized facts, and which uncovers that electoral rules do not exhibit only direct effects
on entry and polarization incentives. A more intricate logic seems to be in operation.
As more disproportional rules generate centripetal forces (see e.g. Cox 1990) and ex-
3The original citizen candidate models focus on plurality rule and have been extended over several
alternative rules and dimensions. Among other, see for example Hamlin and Hjortlund (2000); Morelli
(2004); Levy (2004); Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013); Dellis (2013); Dellis and Oak (2016). For a review
of models where candidacy is endogenous the reader is referred to Bol et al. (2016).
4This literature is really vast, and fully presenting it is beyond the scope of this paper. A recent
discussion of several relevant references may be found in Matakos et al. (2016).
5A large body in the formal literature has focused, instead, on voters’ strategic decisions and detected
the coordinating consequences that electoral rules have on voters’ behavior. In those papers, the sole
focus is on voters: party platforms are exogenous and no entry decisions are made (see e.g. Austen-Smith
and Banks 1988; Fey 1997; Gerber and Ortuño-Ort́ın 1998; Baron and Diermeier 2001; De Sinopoli and
Iannantuoni 2007; Baron et al. 2012; Troumpounis and Xefteris 2016).
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treme parties move towards the center (first-order effect), centrist parties are squeezed
by competition and might eventually drop out (second-order effect). Thus, the electoral
rule influence on entry decisions operates mainly via polarization. Interestingly, this
generates an additional feedback effect: as the number of parties decreases, polarization
becomes even lower in reaction to the smaller number of competing parties (third-order
effect).6 That is, an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits both a direct
(first-order effect) and an indirect (third-order effect) negative force on polarization, and
a negative force on the number of competing parties (second-order effect).
This bi-directional relationship between platform positions (polarization) and the
number of competing parties (entry decision) implies that, despite widespread empiri-
cal support for the aggregate prediction, conclusive causal evidence is still wanting and,
arguably, hard to obtain by the means of real elections’ results. For this reason we turn
to the laboratory and design an experiment in line with the main assumptions of our
theoretical model. In this way we can test not only for the aggregate effect of electoral
rule disproportionality on the number and the platforms of parties, but also for the rele-
vance of the described two-way relationship between platform and entry choices and the
resulting feedback effect.
In our experiment we limit attention to the two most asymmetric rules in terms
of disproportionality (the plurality rule and the PR) and we find strong support for
our theoretical predictions. In aggregate terms, the number of parties and polarization
are found to be significantly higher under PR than under plurality; however, we do
find excessive entry under PR compared to the theoretical benchmark. Moreover, the
described three-step mechanism seems to be in full operation: a) for a fixed number of
parties, polarization decreases when we move from a PR rule to plurality (first-order
effect), b) entry (by the centrist party) is smaller under plurality compared to a PR rule
in anticipation of lower polarization (second-order effect), and c) for a given electoral
rule, polarization is decreasing in the number of parties (third-order effect).
There is a long literature in which researchers have tested in the laboratory the ef-
fect of electoral rules on various aspects of electoral competition.7 There are two sets
of experimental studies that more specifically study the strategic entry of candidates in
an electoral context: those that follow variations of the classic Hotelling-Downs model,
and which typically assume an exogenous number of candidates and pure office motives
(among a large literature see for e.g., Huck et al. 2002; Aragones and Palfrey 2004; Bol
6Palfrey (1984) and Cox (1990) are representative studies showing that polarization is increasing in
the size of realized or anticipated entry.
7Comparative experimental analysis across different electoral rules has recently also focused on other
relevant issues such as information aggregation (Battaglini et al. 2010; Bouton et al. 2016; Herrera et al.
2019a,b), turnout (Herrera et al. 2014) and vote buying (Casella et al. 2012; Tsakas et al. 2018). For a
broader review of lab experiments in political economy, see e.g. Palfrey (2009).
4
et al. 2018), and those that follow the citizen-candidate model (Cadigan 2005; Elbittar
and Gomberg 2009; Kamm 2017; Grosser and Palfrey 2019).8 The latter are closer to
ours because they study the choice of candidates to enter or not, and assume that these
candidates have policy motives in the sense that their payoff is, at least in part, a func-
tion of the distance between their ideal policy position and the policy position ultimately
implemented after the election. However, these studies differ from ours in several impor-
tant aspects. First, in Cadigan (2005), Elbittar and Gomberg (2009), Kamm (2017), and
Grosser and Palfrey (2019), the candidates only choose whether to enter or not. They
cannot choose their policy platform strategically, as they can only compete under their
ideal policy position. Second, our experiment tests the model predictions for two electoral
rules: plurality and proportional representation. Only Kamm (2017) compares these two
electoral rules and also finds that entry is larger under proportional representation, while
others restrict themselves to plurality rule (Cadigan 2005; Grosser and Palfrey 2019),
sometimes in combination with majority runoff (Elbittar and Gomberg 2009). Finally,
unlike Grosser and Palfrey (2019), but similar to other studies, the candidates in our
experiment have complete information about the ideal policy positions of other partici-
pants, and so do voters. By contrast, Grosser and Palfrey (2019) study an environment
with incomplete information, in which voters can only infer candidates’ position from
equilibrium outcomes. Our experiment is thus unique, as it allows the candidates to
enter or not the election, and to compete under the policy platform of their choice, which
might or might not be the same than their ideal position.
Overall, our work makes a dual contribution. On the theory side, existing approaches
that allow for both endogenous entry and platform selection –even solely in the context
of plurality rule– do not consider that candidates have substantial policy concerns, and
hence cannot pin down the identified relationship between entry and polarization (see Bol
et al. 2016). Moreover, this is the first study that formally documents the simultaneous
existence of three intertwined channels through which electoral rules affect parties’ entry
and platform decisions. On the experimental side, our study is the first to propose a
comprehensive test of a political competition model under plurality and proportional
rules, in which both the platform choices and entry decisions are made endogenously
by the participants. As a result, our research design allows us to account for the two-
way relationship between polarization and candidate entry that our theory predicts and
8Tsakas and Xefteris (2018) is placed somewhere in between these groups of papers since it tests
in the laboratory a generalization of the Palfrey (1984) entry model. That is, while entry concerns are
important in determining the candidates’ platform choices, the choice of running (or not) is still not a
strategic choice: the two mainstream candidates necessarily enter, and a third candidate –played by the
computer– enters with a given probability. In our study, both choices (entering or not, and in which
position) are endogenous.
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fully characterize the effects of the electoral rule (dis)proportionality on the party-system
structure.
In what follows, we first present our theoretical arguments (Section 2), then we de-
scribe our experimental design and results (Section 3), and, finally, we conclude (Section




In order to incorporate parties’ entry decision we consider the following “standard” two
stage entry game: In the first stage, parties decide whether to enter the (costly) electoral
race or not. In the second stage, each competing party observes which other parties
entered the race and strategically selects its political platform. Parties’ strategic behav-
ior then determines the electoral outcome and implemented policy (as later detailed),
and hence the subsequently realized payoffs. We focus on subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) in pure strategies where the distribution of policy proposals in the second stage is
symmetric around the center of the policy space.
The policy space is assumed to be continuous, unidimensional, and represented by
the interval Π = [0, 1]. There are three parties j = L,C,R. The leftist party L has ideal
policy πL = 0, the centrist party C has ideal policy πC = 0.5, and the rightist party R
has ideal policy πR = 1. Each party j has to make an entry choice ej = {0, 1} where 1
stands for “entry” and 0 stands for “no entry”, and, a platform choice pj ∈ Π.
Parties have mainly policy concerns and have only as a secondary priority office mo-
tives. Formally, parties have lexicographic preferences with their first priority being to
minimize the distance between the implemented policy p̂ and their ideal point.9 That is,
they aim at maximizing Uj(p̂) = −|p̂−πj|, where p̂ is the implemented policy. If multiple
strategies offer them the same maximal value of Uj(p̂) then they refine their choice by
their second priority. Their second priority is related to their office motives and they
aim at maximizing ψj = Sj − c where Sj denotes party’s j seat share and c = ĉ > 0
is the cost of entering the race with c = 0 if they do not enter. Finally, when parties
are indifferent between announcing two distinct platforms, after taking into account both
9Let us stress that lexicographic preferences do not determine the qualitative characteristics of our
results. We could have instead assumed that parties have mixed motives, with sufficiently low weight
on the office concerns dimension. Given the analytical complexities of such a framework we can only
derive computational results for this smoother case that are available by the corresponding author upon
request. Nevertheless, these computational results are in line with the formal results that we obtain in
the lexicographic preferences setup presented here.
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priorities, then we assume that they prefer to announce the one that is closer to their
ideal policy; and, also, when parties are indifferent between entering or not, after taking
into account both priorities, then we assume that they enter.10 In order to guarantee
that the entry cost is not the determinant of the qualitative features of the equilibrium
we assume that ĉ < 0.25.
Voting, electoral outcome and implemented policy
We assume that there is a continuum of voters, uniformly distributed on the policy space.
Given parties’ entry decisions and their corresponding platform proposals, voters vote in
a sincere manner the party that proposed the platform closest to their ideal policy. If a
voter is indifferent between two or three platforms then she randomizes her vote.
If two parties enter and propose distinct platforms, we are in a standard two-party
competition model where voters on the left of the indifferent voter vote for the party
proposing the leftist platform and voters on the right of the indifferent voter vote for
the party proposing the rightist platform. If all three parties enter the race and propose
distinct platforms, then there exist two indifferent voters and three “bands” of voters
supporting each of the three parties. If two or three parties happen to propose identical
platforms then one just has to keep track of voters randomizing their vote. Obviously, if
only one party enters then it obtains all votes.
If at least one party enters the election let Vj((eL, pL), (eC , pC), (eR, pR)) denote j’s
vote share in the election. We then follow (Theil 1969; Taagepera 1986), and given parties’
vote shares Vj, each party is allocated the following seat share:
Sj((eL, pL), (eC , pC), (eR, pR);n) =
V nj





where n > 1 captures the electoral rule disproportionality. In general, for n = 1 seat
shares correspond to the exact vote shares and hence one refers to a pure proportional
electoral system. As n however increases, the winning party is favored disproportionately.
This simplified manner of mapping electoral outcomes to parliamentary power has been
recently used by Saporiti (2014); Matakos et al. (2016); Herrera et al. (2016) among
others to map in a tractable manner the distortions generated by the electoral rule.
Figure 1 summarizes the seat share allocation using this formula for different levels of
disproportionality in two and three-party competition.
The implemented policy p̂ instead is a function of parties’ power in the parliament SJ
and parties’ proposed platforms (pL, pC , pR). Formally, the implemented policy is given
10These last assumptions help us pin down a unique prediction in certain non-generic cases, and have
no effect on the substantive part of our analysis.
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Figure 1: A party’s seat share as a function of its competitor(s) vote share(s) following
Theil’s rule for two and three-party competition. The graphs on the left represent a
pure PR system where n = 1. The middle graphs a disproportional rule where n = 3.
The right graphs a “winner-take-all” plurality rule where n→∞. For n > 1 the winner
of the election is favored by the electoral rule, and this advantage is becoming bigger as
n increases.
by:
p̂((eL, pL), (eC , pC), (eR, pR);n) =
∑
j=L,C,R
Sj((eL, pL), (eC , pC), (eR, pR);n) ∗ pj
This function captures a consensual democracy (Lijphart 1984; Alesina and Rosenthal
1996), where the implemented policy reflects a post electoral compromise. Each party’s
weight in such compromise is determined by its parliamentary power.11 For simplicity we
assume that if no party enters the election, a status quo policy q ∈ [0, 1] is implemented
and that this status quo policy is known to all parties (this assumption can be relaxed).
11For compromise models under PR elections see Austen-Smith and Banks (1988); Ortuño-Ort́ın
(1997); Gerber and Ortuño-Ort́ın (1998); Merrill and Adams (2007); Llavador (2006); De Sinopoli and
Iannantuoni (2007, 2008); Matakos et al. (2016) among others.
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Theoretical Results
We can now state the main proposition regarding parties’ equilibrium entry and platform
choice decisions.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium and a unique n̂ > 0 such that: (i)









) (ii) for n > n̂ only parties L and R enter and their platform choices are
(p∗∗L , p
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The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix.
The above result is illustrated in Figure 2a. For a given entry cost, if the electoral
system is sufficiently proportional (low values of n) all three parties have incentives to
pay the entry cost and compete in the election. In the case of three-party competition,
the centrist party sticks to its ideal policy (p∗∗∗C =
1
2
) while the two other parties announce
platforms that diverge symmetrically around that point. As the electoral system becomes
more disproportional, the two extreme parties converge towards the center and suppress
the seat share of the centrist party (first-order effect). From a point on (when n > n̂),
the seat share of the centrist party is suppressed sufficiently such that the centrist party
is better off by not paying the entry cost (second-order effect). Notice that no matter
whether two or three parties compete the implemented policy coincides with the ideal
point of the centrist party. That means that the centrist party enters the election only
to maximize its office benefits (its second priority). Hence for sufficiently disproportional
electoral systems, only two parties remain active in the political arena.12
As we have shown, the electoral rule affects both the number of parties and polariza-
tion (polarization is defined throughout the paper as the distance between the two most
extreme platforms). But note that its effect on polarization is actually twofold. Figure
2b helps to illustrate this argument. First, note that for a given number of parties, there
is a direct negative effect of the disproportionality of the electoral rule on polarization.
As the rule becomes more disproportional, parties L and R tend to propose more cen-
trist platforms. This direct effect highlights that for a given number of parties, more
12While we consider that the employed sequential timing –first entry then platform choice– is realistic
and captures the dynamics of electoral competition in several contexts, it is obviously not the only rele-
vant one. Hence, we should note that our results qualify to a simultaneous version of our model in which
both entry and platform decisions take place simultaneously, with the following modification: while the
sequential version that we study admits a unique equilibrium for (essentially) every level of dispropor-
tionality, the simultaneous version would admit two equilibria for intermediate disproportionality levels
(one with two entrants and one with three). That is, the comparative results that we have identified
would still hold but in an, arguably, coarser way: As disproportionality increases the number of entrants
in equilibrium will decrease, but this now means that there are two disproportionality levels n′ and n′′
such that for n < n′ we have three entrants, for n in [n′, n′′] we have either two or three entrants and
for n > n′′ we have two entrants. Similarly, polarization decreases with disproportionality.
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(a) Proposed platforms as a function of n as
characterized in Proposition 1 (c = 0.22 which
implies that n̂ = 2.5).
(b) Proposed platforms for a given number of
parties as a function of n (three parties with
dotted lines, two parties with solid lines).
Figure 2: The effect of electoral disproportionality n on the number of parties and polar-
ization.
proportional electoral rules are associated with higher levels of polarization. Second, as
the same graph highlights, the number of parties also affects polarization. That is, for
a given level of disproportionality, polarization is higher in a three-party election than
in a two-party election. Hence, for any rule, increasing entry from two to three parties,
endogenously increases polarization.13 This is because when three parties compete, the
presence of the centrist party makes the extreme parties less willing to converge towards
the centre than in the two party case. But note that as we have shown in Proposition
1 and Figure 2a, the electoral rule affects the number of competing parties. Hence via
the endogenous change in the number of parties, the electoral rule has also an additional
indirect effect on polarization (third-order effect).14 The above effects of the electoral
13Similarly, in a variant of our model where platforms are fixed at (1 − x, 1/2, x) and only entry is
endogenous, for any electoral rule disproportionality the number of entrants can be shown to increase in
x.
14While an extension to an arbitrary number of parties is not tractable, it is noteworthy that the basic
forces supporting our formal results do not seem to crucially depend on the exact number of players.
In every strategy profile in which the candidates that decide to enter occupy distinct locations, the
incentives of the two most extreme entrants to move towards the center become stronger as the rule
rewards more intensely any increase in their vote shares. But also a potential move of the extremists
towards the center will cause a loss of votes for their neighboring more moderate entrants, and thus
exiting will become more attractive for them.
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disproportionality on the number of parties and polarization can be summarized in the
following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 [first-order effect] : For a given number of parties the electoral rule
disproportionality has a negative effect on polarization (Figure 2b).
Hypothesis 2 [second-order effect] : The electoral rule disproportionality has a
negative effect on the number of parties due to the centrist party not entering the electoral
competition (Figure 2a).
Hypothesis 3 [third-order effect] : For the same electoral rule disproportionality,
a smaller number of parties leads, generically, to lower polarization (Figure 2b).
Whether these three channels operate simultaneously or not is unfortunately difficult
to test in an empirical context. Therefore experimental investigation seems appropriate
for this setting.
3 The Experiment
We conducted 14 experimental sessions between January 2018 and March 2019 at the
LExEL Lab of the University of Lancaster with 190 unique subjects participating in
the experiment. The pool of participants is composed of undergraduate and postgradu-
ate university students from various degrees. Participants were recruited using standard
procedures via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was executed on z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher 2007).
Each session involved 10 or 15 participants (depending on the treatment) playing
the role of candidates. In each session, subjects were matched in 5 groups (of 2 or 3).
Each subject played for 25 times. Hence, in each session we collected 5 ∗ 25 = 125
observations at the “election” level. Depending on whether the treatment required two
or three participants at each group, we collected 250 or 375 decisions at the “individual”
level. We hence have data for a total of 1745 elections and 4735 individual decisions.15 Six
treatments were designed to test the previously stated hypotheses and are summarized
in Table 1.
Treatments T1 and T2 are our main treatments with endogenous entry across electoral
rules, replicating closely the theoretical model previously presented. Treatments T3-T6
instead shut down the entry channel and focus on an exogenous number of parties. Since
T3-T6 are simplified versions of T1 and T2, we first detail the experimental design of
15There was a technical problem in one of the experimental sessions conducting one of the three T2
treatments. We lost the data for the last period of the session, meaning 5 elections and 15 individual-
decisions.
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Number of parties Endogenous Endogenous 3 parties 3 parties 2 parties 2 parties
Electoral rule PR Plurality PR Plurality PR Plurality
Number of sessions 3 3 2 2 2 2
Number of elections 375 370 250 250 250 250
the “endogenous” T1-T2 treatments. We then present the necessary modifications to
implement the “exogenous” T3-T6 treatments.
In each session implementing T1 or T2, there are 15 participants playing in 5 groups
of 3. The groups are formed randomly, and groups play together for a series of 5 elections.
Groups are randomly reshuffled at the end of each series of 5 elections for 5 times. That is,
in each session, each participant makes 25 decisions (five series of five elections).16 In each
group, participants are randomly assigned to an ideal policy on a discrete policy space
from 0 to 10 that they maintain throughout the series of five elections. The randomization
is made so that, in each group, there is one participant at position 0 (P0), one at position
5 (P5), and one at position 10 (P10).
For each election, participants in the same group play the following two stage game:
In the first stage, participants knowing their ideal policy, simultaneously decide whether
to enter the election or not (at a cost). At the end of the first stage, participants that
entered the election see on their screen the ideal policies of other entering participants
within their group.
In the second stage, the participants who entered the election in the first stage propose
a policy platform. They can propose any discrete point on the 0-10 scale. Then, 11 voters
who are also located on the 0-10 scale, one at each discrete point, and who are played
by the computer, vote. Their vote follows a simple rule: they vote for the platform that
is the closest to them. In case they are equally close to two or three platforms, their
vote is equally split between these platforms. Table 2 gives a representation of a typical
situation of the experimental game where all three participants P0, P5 and P10 entered
the election and proposed platforms 1, 5 and 6 respectively.17
16Despite our theoretical prediction referring to a one-shot game and the implemented version in
the lab being of repeated nature, there are several reasons that reassure us regarding the validity of the
theoretical predictions. First, note that subjects are matched in the same group for only 5 rounds. Given
the short span, it would be difficult for players to figure out and implement a coordination strategy that
would prove mutually beneficial. Moreover, the equilibrium of the one-shot game performs rather well
in utilitarian terms (i.e., in equilibrium the sum of individual utilities is either maximal, or very close to
being so) making mutually beneficial deviations wanting. Perhaps more importantly, since the one-shot
game admits a unique equilibrium, the corresponding repeated game should admit a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium which follows the equilibrium strategy of the one-shot game in every period.
17Note that we did not present the game as a simulation of elections to participants. To facilitate the
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Table 2: Example of an experimental situation
Proposals P0 P5 P10
Platform 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Voters V0 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10
Total
Votes for P0 3.5 1 1 1 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Votes for P5 2.5 0 0 0 .5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Votes for P10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
The treatment across T1 and T2 is the disproportionality of the electoral rule. T2
implements the plurality rule where the implemented policy is the most voted proposal.18
T1 instead implements a PR rule where the implemented policy is the average of all
proposed policies, weighted by the number of votes they received. For the example of
Table 2, the implemented policy under PR is hence (1 × 3.5 + 5 × 2.5+ 6 × 5) / 11 =
4.18, and 6 under plurality.19
The payoff structure across both treatments is the following: all participants receive
a policy payoff that depends on the distance between their ideal and implemented policy,
so that their policy payoff equals 12 × [10 - (distance)]. For example, if the participant’s
ideal policy is 0 and the implemented policy is 5, she receives 12 × [10 - 5] = 60 points.
Participants entering the election pay a cost of 2 points, and receive an office payoff
depending on the treatment and the number of votes that their platform gets. Under
plurality, the participant whose proposal is implemented gets 11 points. Under PR,
the number of points equals the number of votes received by the proposal. The payoff
structure here replicates the lexicographic preferences of our model in a natural and easy
way to introduce in the lab. In short, lexicographic preferences are effectively introduced
since the minimum effect that a change in a participant’s strategy can have on her policy
payoff is always greater than the effect this change can have on her office payoff.20
understanding of the rules, we decided to frame the game as a simulation of a dinner organization among
friends. Of course, the structure of incentives closely follows the theoretical model of candidate entry
in elections presented above. In more detail, the subjects were playing the role of candidates by first
choosing whether they wanted to declare themselves as hosts of the dinner (at a cost). Potential hosts
then had to propose how many food portions should be prepared for dinner. Those could be any integer
number between 0 and 10. Voting was computerized (as in Table 2) and chosen policies and payoffs were
implemented as described in the main text. The main reason we took this framing decision is that our
experiment –in particular the implemented policy under PR– is quite challenging to implement in the
lab, especially in a completely neutral framework. The proposed setting instead, proved understandable
to subjects and it should not have created as strong framing concerns as a “left-right” spectrum.
18In case of tie, the computer decides upon the implemented policy by choosing the less extreme
among the tied platforms, that is the one that is the closest to 5. In case the tied platforms are equally
extreme, the computer randomly chooses the implemented policy among them.
19We round the final value so that it equals the closest discrete point, 4 in this example.
20 In some more detail, the above payoff structure together with the rounding in the PR treatment
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Treatments T1 and T2 closely replicate our theoretical setting where the three mech-
anisms presented in Hypotheses 1 to 3 are at play. Clearly, T1 and T2 serve as the
test-bed for Hypothesis 2 on the effect of the electoral rule on the number of competing
parties via participants’ first stage decisions. Nevertheless, testing Hypotheses 1 and 3
using data generated by T1 and T2 is not immune to reasonable criticisms. First, our
theory predicts that entry is lower in T2 than T1. Hence, our data obtained in T1 and T2
for a given number of entries will be unbalanced across electoral rules. Second, actions in
the second stage with two entrants may be confounded by what happened in the entry
stage. That is, subjects may self-select into two or three-party elections and therefore
subjects in groups with two entrants might be different (in observable or unobservable
characteristics) from those in groups with three entrants. For the above reasons, T3-
T6 are implementing simplified one-stage versions of T1-T2 where we eliminate the entry
stage. By fixing the number of entries, we obtain further (balanced) data and robust tests
of Hypotheses 1 and 3. As Table 1 summarizes, T3 and T4 involve three participants
(P0,P5, and P10) and variation in the rule. T5 and T6 instead involve two participants
(P0 and P10) and again variation in the rule. Hypothesis 1 can then be tested comparing
data across T3 and T4 for the three entrant case, and across T5 and T6 for the two
entrant case. Hypothesis 3 instead can be tested comparing data across T3 and T5 for
the PR rule, and across T4 and T6 for the plurality rule.
For all treatments, at the beginning of each session, participants receive detailed in-
structions explaining the rules of the game, and respond to a quiz about these instructions.
There is no incentive associated to this quiz, but it serves at increasing participants’ un-
derstanding of the rules. The participants have all and common information about the
rules and there is no deception. The instructions and quiz questions can be found in sup-
plementary material S1 and S2. After each election, the participants see the full result of
the election: the platform proposed by other participants of their group, their votes, and
their payoff (full information). A screen shot of the feedback given to participants can
be found in supplementary material S3, together with screen shots from decision screens
(first and second stage for the T1 & T2 treatments). Finally, at the end of each session,
one election is randomly selected by the computer, and the payoffs are converted into
money so that 10 points = £0.7. There is also a fixed fee of £5 for participating in the
experiment. The experimental sessions lasted on average slightly less than an hour and
participants made on average £10.19.
to the closest integer (see Footnote 19), and the tie breaking rule in case of the plurality treatment (see
Footnote 18) jointly guarantee the lexicographic payoff structure. The tie breaking and rounding rules
simply guarantee that the minimum change in policy that a change in a player’s strategy can induce is
of one unit. The payoff formula guarantees that the points from such minimum unitary change in policy
(12 points) are always larger than the maximum payoff change from the office payoff (11 points in the
plurality treatment).
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Before proceeding with our experimental results, let us describe further the link be-
tween our theoretical and experimental settings. T1 and T2 maintain the timing and
preferences of our theoretical model. In the equilibrium of the proportional treatment,
the parameters are chosen such that in the first stage all three subjects should enter. In
the plurality treatment instead, only P0 and P10 should enter. The second stage equilib-
rium platforms for our experimental setup are as follows: In the plurality treatment, both
P0 and P10 propose platform 5. In the PR treatment, the equilibrium is in mixed strate-
gies.21 P0 assigns most weight to 2 (weight equal to 7/8). Proposals 0 and 3 also belong in
the support of the mixed strategy with weight 1/24 and 1/12 respectively. P10 is playing
symmetrically assigning positive weights at platforms 7, 8, and 10. In expectation, the
platforms proposed by P0 and P10 are 2 and 8. P5 instead proposes 5. Regarding the
treatments without entry (T3-T6), the equilibrium platforms of T3 (3-party PR) and T6
(2-party plurality) naturally coincide with the equilibrium platforms of T1 (endogenous
PR) and T2 (endogenous plurality). In treatment T4 (3-party plurality), the equilibrium
platforms are (4,5,6) for P0, P5, and P10 respectively. In treatment T5 (2-party PR), P0
and P10 play the same mixed strategies as in T1.
Summing up, despite introducing a discrete policy space in the lab for practical rea-
sons (i.e., to implement lexicographic preferences but also obtain less noisy data than a
continuum), the qualitative features presented in our three theoretically derived hypothe-
ses are maintained. Results on the three hypotheses are presented next.
Experimental results
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics at the election level on the number of entering
candidates (relevant in treatments T1 & T2), and the average policy platform proposals
(relevant in all treatments). Focusing on the endogenous entry treatments (T1 & T2),
in most elections there are three entries (79.47% and 57.84% of the observations respec-
tively). However, there is a substantial percentage of elections with two entering parties
under both systems (18.67% and 37.3%). In line with our theoretical prediction, descrip-
tive statistics indicate that entry is higher in the PR treatment compared to the plurality
one. There are also few elections with less than two entries (less than 5%). From the
lower panel of Table 3, we observe that the average policy platform proposal is around 5
across all treatments. Obviously, averages may hide relevant differences in distributions.
Figure 3 offers the histograms of platform proposals across the six treatments.
The left panel of Figure 3 summarizes proposals obtained in the second stage of the
treatments with entry (T1 & T2). The middle panel summarizes proposals when the
21Mixed equilibria under PR were computed using Gambit (McKelvey et al. 2006).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics (elections)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Endog. Endog. 3 parties 3 parties 2 parties 2 parties
PR Plurality PR Plurality PR Plurality
Number of entering parties (Frequencies)
0 entry 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0)
1 entry 1.87 4.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(7) (16) (0) (0) (0) (0)
2 entries 18.67 37.30 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
(70) (138) (0) (0) (250) (250)
3 entries 79.47 57.84 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
(298) (214) (250) (250) (0) (0)
Average proposal 5.08 5.10 5.14 5.12 4.84 5.23
(0.92) (0.82) (1.04) (0.97) (1.56) (1.32)
Note: Upper panel: entries are percentages, number of observations is in parentheses.
Lower panel: entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses.
number of competing parties is fixed to three (T3 & T4), and the panel on the right
when the number of competing parties is fixed to two (T5 & T6). Solid lines repre-
sent treatments under a PR rule, dashed lines represent treatments under the plurality
rule. Visual observation of those graphs suggests that platform proposals vary across
treatments, where both rules and the number of competing parties seem to matter.
Focus first, on the two-party treatments (T5 & T6). Under plurality, platforms are
concentrated around the median. Under PR, platforms are more spread and towards
more extreme proposals. Focusing on the three-party treatments (T3 & T4), the message
is similar. While there is a peak at the median for both rules (due to the presence of
P5), subjects seem to move towards the extremes more under the PR rule than under the
plurality rule. These descriptive differences in platform proposals are actually compatible
with our Hypotheses that we later test. Fixing the number of parties, polarization is
higher under PR than under plurality. Moreover, note that on the left graph of Figure
3, observations are obtained in treatments with endogenous entry choices, and hence
proposals reflect a mixture of two and three-party elections. As one can observe, proposed
platforms in the endogenous plurality treatment (T2) resemble the two-party plurality
treatment (T6), while the endogenous PR treatment (T1) resembles the three-party PR
treatment (T3). This observation seems in line with our theoretical prediction suggesting
two entrants (P0 and P10) under the plurality treatment (T2), and three entrants (P0,
P5, and P10) under the PR treatment (T1).
Having presented our aggregate data and descriptive differences across treatments, we
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Figure 3: Histograms of proposals by treatment
proceed by formally testing our three hypotheses. First, we focus on the treatments with
entry where as previously described all three effects of the electoral rule on the number
of parties and polarization are present. Then we focus on treatments T3-T6 where by
shutting down the entry channel we offer a clean test of Hypotheses 1 and 3.
Treatments with Entry (T1-T2)
According to Hypothesis 1, polarization should be smaller under plurality than under
PR for a given number of parties. The corresponding rows of Table 4 show the average
polarization, i.e. the difference between the minimal and maximal platforms on the 0-10
policy scale, per electoral system depending on whether two or three candidates entered
the election.22 We observe that, in line with our model, polarization is substantially
greater under PR than under plurality both in two party and three party elections. A
t-test reveals that differences are statistically significant at a level of p < 0.01.
According to Hypothesis 2, the number of entries should be larger under PR than
22While polarization is the main variable of interest in our analysis one can show that other measures
of dispersion such as platforms’ extremism (i.e., average distance of two most extreme platforms from
the centre) behave in a similar manner.
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Table 4: Bivariate test of hypotheses (T1 & T2)
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 1.95 (1.76) 4.54 (2.92) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 3.17 (2.04) 6.95 (2.24) 0.00
Hypothesis 2 Plurality PR P-value
Number of entries 2.52 (0.61) 2.78 (0.46) 0.00
Number of entries (w/o 0,1 entries) 2.61 (0.49) 2.81 (0.39) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.95 (1.76) 3.17 (2.04) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 4.54 (2.92) 6.95 (2.24) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
under plurality. This is exactly what we find in our data. Table 4 reveals that there are
on average 2.78 entries in an election under PR, and 2.52 in an election under plurality.
This difference (+0.26) is equivalent to a 0.5 increase in the standard deviation of the
variable across treatments (0.56), and statistically significant at a level of p <0.01. The
results are similar when we remove the few elections with one entry or less.
Finally, according to Hypothesis 3, fixing the electoral rule, polarization is generically
larger when there are three instead of two entries (the elections with zero or one entry
are naturally excluded from this test). From Table 4, we see that polarization is larger by
1.22 under plurality, and by 2.41 under PR. These differences, respectively, correspond to
0.4 and 0.8 of the standard deviation of the variable across treatment and are statistically
significant at a level of p <0.01.
Nevertheless, polarization is predicted to be strictly increasing in the number of par-
ties only under the plurality rule. Under the PR rule, P0 and P10 face no additional
incentives to approach the center when they are the sole two entrants (see Figure 2b for
n = 1). The discrepancy between our theoretical predictions and our experimental data
seems to be due to our data obtained in two-party elections also containing (off equi-
librium) observations where one of the two entrants is P5. In order to obtain a cleaner
understanding of Hypothesis 3, in Table 5, we split two-entry elections to those that one
of the two entrants is the centrist candidate P5, and those that the two entrants are P0
and P10.23
Focusing on PR, if the two entrants are P0 and P10, Table 5 shows that polarization
is not affected by the number of entrants in a significant manner (7.08 and 6.95 for two
and three entries respectively). If instead the centrist candidate P5 is one of the two
23In the Appendix we also present our main bivariate tests distinguishing between the first and last
elections of each experimental session (Tables A1-A3). Our main results appear robust across periods.
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entrants, polarization is increasing in the number entries (3.22 and 6.95 for two and three
entries respectively). These results are in line with the theory. As previously detailed,
when all three subjects enter in the election, polarization is in expectation equal to 6
(equilibrium PR platforms played by the two extreme candidates are in expectation 2
and 8). The same level of polarization is expected when P0 and P10 are the only two
entering candidates.24 If instead, the centrist candidate P5 is one of the two entrants,
polarization is in expectation equal to 5 and hence lower than when all three subjects
enter.25 Focusing on the plurality rule, Table 5 reveals that as expected, polarization
is increasing in the number of parties regardless of the ideologies of the two entering
candidates.26
Table 5: Breakdown of Hypothesis 3 (T1 & T2)
2 entries with P5 not entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 2.00 (1.76) 3.17 (2.04) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 7.08 (2.60) 6.95 (2.24) 0.80
2 entries with P5 entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.87 (1.77) 3.17 (2.04) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 3.22 (2.07) 6.95 (2.24) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
Finally, we focus on individual decisions to understand which participants are re-
sponsible for the aggregate effects presented in our three hypotheses. Table 6 shows
participants’ decisions (entry and proposed policy platform) per electoral system as a
function of their position on the 0-10 policy scale. The upper panel of the table reveals
that participants with an extreme position (0 and 10) enter as often under both electoral
systems (entry percentage between 0.89 and 0.94). However, as predicted by our model,
the centrist participant enters less often under plurality than under PR (0.73 versus 0.93,
statistically significant at a level of p <0.01). Hence, in line with our theory, the difference
in terms of number of entries across electoral systems is due to the centrist candidate
entering at a lower rate under plurality than under PR.
The lower panel of Table 6 shows that the platform proposed by the participant located
24This follows from this off equilibrium subgame being identical to T5 and the previously detailed
equilibrium for our two-party PR treatment.
25The equilibrium strategies of the off equilibrium subgame in which only P5 and P10 enter are as
follows: P5 assigns weights equal to 7/8, 1/12, and 1/24 at platforms 2, 3, and 4 respectively; while P10
assigns weights equal to 11/12,1/24, and 1/24 at platforms 7, 8, and 10 respectively. In expectation, P5’s
platform is 2.17 and P10’s platform is 7.17, hence leading to polarization of 5. A symmetric situation
arises when the entrants are P5 and P0.
26In a two-party plurality election, regardless of the ideology of the entrants, both propose platform
5. Recall from the described equilibrium in T4 that polarization is higher when all three subjects enter.
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Table 6: Individual-level decisions (T1 & T2)
Entry Plurality PR P-value
P0 0.89 (0.31) 0.91 (0.29) 0.50
P5 0.73 (0.45) 0.93 (0.25) 0.00
P10 0.90 (0.30) 0.94 (0.25) 0.10
Proposed platform Plurality PR P-value
P0 3.84 (1.69) 1.80 (2.06) 0.00
P5 5.09 (0.72) 5.01 (0.77) 0.19
P10 6.37 (1.63) 8.45 (1.80) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
at the policy position 5 is no different under both electoral systems and actually close
to our theoretical prediction for the case of three party elections for both rules (between
5.01 to 5.09 on average). However, the participants located at positions 0 and 10 choose
more extreme platforms under PR than under plurality. The average platform chosen is,
respectively, 1.80 and 8.45 under PR, and 3.84 and 6.37 under plurality. The standard
deviation also indicates that there is more variation in the platform chosen by participants
located at 0 and 10, than in the platform chosen by the participant located at 5. The
extreme candidates hence seem responsible for the observed difference in polarization
across electoral systems.
Treatments without Entry (T3-T6)
We next present data obtained in treatments T3-T6 where the number of candidates is
fixed. These results offer a clean test of Hypotheses 1 and 3. In contrast to T1 and
T2, we now also control the number of entrants and their ideologies, while we avoid any
confounding concerns due to the entry stage. Also our number of observations is large
and our data is balanced. Results are in line with our theoretical predictions, and provide
robust support of the results obtained in the treatments with entry T1 and T2.
Table 7 reports the results of bivariate tests of the relevant hypotheses. These re-
sults corroborate the findings presented above: In line with Hypothesis 1, polarization is
larger under PR than under plurality when there are two (+3.92 points) as well as three
competing candidates (+1.94 points). These differences are statistically significant at a
level of p <0.01. In line with Hypothesis 3, we also observe that polarization is larger
when there are three rather than two parties under plurality (the increase is of +2.32
(p <0.01)). Under PR, the number of parties does not substantively affect the degree
of polarization (+0.34, not statistically significant). Finally, in Table 8, we summarize
individual platforms across treatments and participants’ ideal policies. Similar to Table
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Table 7: Bivariate test of hypotheses (T3-T6)
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 2.14 (2.19) 5.73 (2.72) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 4.13 (1.95) 6.07 (2.33) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 2.14 (2.19) 4.13 (1.95) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 5.73 (2.72) 6.07 (2.33) 0.13
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
6, extreme participants are the ones responsible for changes in polarization levels across
electoral systems.
Table 8: Individual-level decisions (T3-T6)
Proposed platform (2 entries) Plurality PR P-value
P0 4.30 (1.98) 2.12 (2.37) 0.00
P10 6.16 (1.65) 7.56 (2.14) 0.00
Proposed platform (3 entries) Plurality PR P-value
P0 3.70 (2.11) 2.34 (2.22) 0.00
P5 5.01 (1.53 ) 5.12 (1.13) 0.35
P10 6.64 (1.79) 7.96 (1.83) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
We can summarize our experimental results as following. In line with Hypothesis
1 [first-order effect ], we observe that, PR increases the distance between the platform
chosen by two most extreme candidates compared to plurality, regardless of the number
of entering candidates. In line with Hypothesis 2 [second-order effect ], we observe that
PR increases the number of entering candidates because of the centrist candidate entering
at a lower rate under plurality. Finally, we observe that, in line with Hypothesis 3 [third-
order effect ], polarization is increasing in the number of entries because of the non-centrist
candidates choosing more extreme platforms when the centrist candidate enters.
4 Conclusions
Our paper develops a formal model where both candidates’ entry and location decisions
are endogenously determined under different electoral rules. This allows us to account
for the bi-directional effect between party platform positions (polarization) and entry
decisions in addition to the first-order effect of electoral rule (dis)proportionality on po-
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larization. Thus our model provides a formal result in line with Duverger (1954) hy-
potheses that stipulate that more candidates advancing distinct positions participate in
proportional elections than in majoritarian ones.
But, perhaps more importantly, our model identifies three distinct channels that are
simultaneously in operation and generates testable empirical predictions. We then take
our model in the lab, where we find strong support for our generated predictions: even
controlling for the number of competing candidates, disproportional elections induce lower
levels of polarization (what we call the first-order effect); but, in addition to this effect,
disproportional rules (by providing centripetal incentives and inducing over-competition
in the center of the policy space) affect entry decisions in a negative way (second-order
effect). Thus, a third-order effect of electoral rules on polarization operates via the
number of candidates: even for the same degree of electoral rule disproportionality, the
reduction in the number of candidates has a negative effect on polarization.
By identifying those three channels and showing their simultaneous existence in the
lab, our paper sheds more light in the relationship between electoral rules, strategic
entry and polarization. It highlights the fact that strategic decisions on location and
entry that parties make are intrinsically intertwined and are both affected by type of
electoral institutions via the incentives they provide. Thus to understand the impact
of institutional choice on the fundamentals of electoral competition we require a more
nuanced approach that does not mute such channels.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the available actions for each party in the first stage
there are eight policy-selection subgames. To fully characterize an equilibrium for the
whole game we first need to see what happens in each of these subgames.
Case 1 (No party enters) In this case we have assumed that a status quo policy
q ∈ [0, 1] is implemented (known to everybody).
Case 2 (A single party enters) If only party j entered then it selects pj = πj as
it is the unique choice that maximizes Uj(p̂) (given that p̂ = pj in this case). So if only
L entered the race we have p̂ = pL = πL = 0, if only C entered the race we have p̂ =
pC = πC =
1
2
and if only R entered the race we have p̂ = pR = πR = 1.
Case 3 (Two parties enter) If only party j and party k such that πj < πk entered









) and p̂ = 1
2
. This is trivial for the case
(j, k) = (L,R) (from Proposition 1 of Matakos et al. (2016)) but it directly extends to
the cases (j, k) = (L,C) and (j, k) = (C,R) as well. To see why it does, consider for
example that only parties L and C entered the race. From Proposition 1 and 2 of Matakos
et al. (2016) we know that if parties L and R compete there exists a unique equilibrium
and in this unique equilibrium p̂ = 1
2
. Since in that case each party wishes to drag the
implemented policy as near as possible to a different extreme policy it follows that, for




guarantees that p̂ ≤ 1
2
independently of what R chooses and,




guarantees that p̂ ≥ 1
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independently of what L chooses.
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(pL 6= 12 −
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). Returning in our extended form game and in
the case in which only parties L and C entered the race we notice with the help of the









) with p̂ = 1
2
must be an equilibrium because if
L deviates to another policy we will get p̂ > 1
2
(party L will be strictly worse off) and if
party C deviates to any other policy we will get p̂ < 1
2
(party C will be strictly worse off),
and b) this equilibrium is unique. This is so because for any pL the best response of C





party L’s best response
induces p̂ < 1
2
. All these obviously hold (in the reverse way) for the (j, k) = (C,R) case
as well.
Case 4 (All three parties enter) If all three parties enter then we are in the case















So each policy selection subgame has essentially a unique equilibrium. This makes
identification of a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) tractable.
First, we argue that in a SPE at least two parties should enter. If no party is expected
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to enter then the implemented policy will be q ∈ [0, 1]. In that case a party j with πj 6= q
is strictly better off by entering and, thus, implementing her ideal policy. If only one
extreme party is expected to enter and implement its ideal policy then the other extreme
party, for example, is better off by entering too and, thus, moving the implemented policy
to 1
2
. If only the centrist party is expected to enter and implement its ideal policy (1
2
)
then an extreme party has incentives to enter. By entering the extreme party will not
affect the implemented policy (we argued in case 3 that if the centrist runs against an
extremist then the implemented policy will be 1
2
) but will enjoy an increase in the second
element of its lexicographic preferences, ψj. This is so because if the extremist j does not
enter and only the centrist party runs, then ψj = 0 (because Sj = 0 and c = 0) but if it
runs against the centrist it will enjoy ψj = 0 (because Sj =
1
2
and c < 1
2
).
Second, we will argue that if a SPE in which all three parties enter exists then gener-
ically no SPE exists in which only two parties enter. This is straightforward for the
following reason. If a SPE in which all three parties enter exists then this implies that
if a party expects that only the two other parties will run it also strictly prefers to run
(apart from cases of measure zero in which for some party/ies Sj = ĉ in the equilibrium
of the three party subgame); entering does not affect implemented policy but increases
the value of ψj.
Third, we notice that in the equilibrium of the three party subgame ∂SC
∂n
< 0. This





By a careful composition of all the observations above we arrive to the main result.
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) is the a SPE of the game. This is so because if a
party j deviated to not entering it would not affect the implemented policy but it would
get a strictly lower ψj. Moreover, by our first and second argument it becomes evident
that this SPE is unique. By increasing n our third observation dictates that the SPE




and for n→∞ we have that SC → 0 there should exist some n̂ > 0 such that for every
n ≤ n̂ we have SC ≥ ĉ and for every n > n̂ we have SC < ĉ. For n ≤ n̂ as stated
above we have a unique SPE and in this equilibrium all three parties enter. For n > n̂
the unique SPE is such that only parties L and R enter and their platform choices are
(p∗∗L , p
∗∗









). Existence is established by the following argument. If only
parties L and R are expected to run then C is strictly better off by not running. Its
decision to enter does not affect the implemented policy but if it does not run it gets
ψC = 0 while if it runs it gets ψC < 0. Party L (R) is strictly better off by running
because if it does not the other extremist party will run alone and will thus implement its
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ideal policy, while if it runs the implemented policy will be 1
2
. Uniqueness is guaranteed
by the facts that a) an equilibrium with three parties entering is not feasible (as party
C is strictly better off by staying out when the other two are expected to run) and b)
if another SPE exists it should be such that only parties L and C (R and C) run. If
party R expects that parties L and C will run then it is strictly better off by running.
Its entry decision will not affect the implemented policy but it will increase its ψR from
zero (in the case of no entry) to something strictly positive (in the case of entry). This







Table A1: Bivariate test of hypotheses by period (T1 & T2)
15 first elections
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 2.00 (1.84) 4.27 (3.11) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 3.34 (2.26) 6.54 (2.32) 0.00
Hypothesis 2 Plurality PR P-value
Number of entries 2.46 (0.64) 2.76 (0.48) 0.00
Number of entries (w/o 0,1 entries) 2.57 (0.50) 2.80 (0.40) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 2.00 (1.84) 3.34 (2.26) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 4.27 (3.11) 6.54 (2.32) 0.00
10 last elections
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 1.85 (1.61) 5.04 (2.52) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 2.95 (1.70) 7.52 (2.00) 0.00
Hypothesis 2 Plurality PR P-value
Number of entries 2.63 (0.53) 2.81 (0.43) 0.00
Number of entries (w/o 0,1 entries) 2.66 (0.47) 2.83 (0.38) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.85 (1.61) 2.95 (1.70) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 5.04 (2.52) 7.52 (2.00) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
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Table A2: Bivariate test of hypotheses, breakdown of Hypothesis 3 by period
(T1-T2)
15 first elections
2 entries with P5 not entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 2.12 (1.93) 3.34 (2.26) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 7.00 (2.83) 6.54 (2.32) 0.55
2 entries with P5 entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.84 (1.72) 3.34 (2.26) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 2.90 (2.25) 6.54 (2.32) 0.00
10 last elections
2 entries with P5 not entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.82 (1.47) 2.95 (1.70) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 7.22 (2.33) 7.52 (2.00) 0.71
2 entries with P5 entering 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.93 (1.98) 2.95 (1.70) 0.09
Polarization (PR) 3.81 (1.68) 7.52 (2.00) 0.00
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
Table A3: Bivariate test of hypotheses by period (T3-T6)
15 first elections
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 2.53 (2.36) 5.53 (2.88) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 3.93 (1.92) 5.76 (2.52) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 2.53 (2.36) 3.93 (1.92) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 5.53 (2.88) 5.76 (2.52) 0.46
10 last elections
Hypothesis 1 Plurality PR P-value
Polarization (2 entries) 1.62 (1.96) 6.03 (2.44) 0.00
Polarization (3 entries) 4.43 (1.96) 6.54 (1.93) 0.00
Hypothesis 3 2 entries 3 entries P-value
Polarization (Plurality) 1.62 (1.96) 4.43 (1.96) 0.00
Polarization (PR) 6.03 (2.44) 6.54 (1.93) 0.10
Note: Entries are averages, standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for
two-tailed mean differences t-tests with unequal variance.
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